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THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY*
OSCAR HANDLIN**
The concept of equality entered only tangentially into the Constitu-
tion as ratified in 1789. This was not a subject that greatly concerned
either the framers of that document or the people who ratified it. The
members of the Convention, after all, had met primarily to put together
a federal frame of government: and they composed a charter that they
hoped would draw together the disparate elements of the nation. In
doing so, they had to take much for granted, including the existing pat-
terns of state action. Attention went primarily to the disposition of
powers among the agencies that were to exercise them. Only much
later did the constitutional provisions apply directly to persons.
In the thinking and usage of the eighteenth-century founders, the
word "equality" applied to a condition in which the state treated indi-
viduals alike, without the interjection of the European distinctions of
status with which the framers were familiar, directly or indirectly. That
is, they had in mind equality under the law.
The Constitution's silence on the matter makes it necessary to go
back to previous statements about the issue in order to understand the
precise connotation of the concept of equality. Those most frequently
cited came early in the Revolution in the Declaration of Independence.
The preamble to that document asserted categorically that all men were
created equal.' That broad statement evoked little controversy at that
time, for it was in accord with the general philosophy that prevailed in
the late eighteenth century when the colonists gained their indepen-
dence. The understanding that could be taken for granted then, how-
ever, has by no means survived intact through two intervening
centuries.
We can approach the meaning of the term "equal" in the Declara-
tion by noting its use in the first paragraph of the preamble in a clause
* A lecture delivered at Washington University on November 8, 1978, as the second in a
series on The Questfor Equalitr.
** Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor, Department of History, Harvard University.
,VB., 1934, Brooklyn College; A.M., 1935, Ph.D., 1940, Harvard University.
1. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. ... 2 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 200 (P. Ford ed. 1904).
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that described the process by which a people assumed "the separate
and equal station" to which the laws of Nature entitled it. The mean-
ing there was identical to that in the statement of the equality of
men-equality in those unalienable rights with which their Creator had
endowed them. The Virginia constitution put it simply and more
clearly when it stated that men were by nature-not equal-but
equally free and independent.2
This view of equality was narrow. By equal, the author of the Decla-
ration and his contemporaries did not mean identical. They recognized
that individual differences existed and were important. Therein they
agreed with the dominant opinion of their times. Even Rousseau, the
best known theorist on the subject, believed that men differed in natu-
ral endowments and that civilization made those inequalities significant
so that absolute equality in any society was unthinkable.3
People were not alike in their capacities at birth and, with growth
and maturity, the disparities in intellect and in moral sense would
widen. Jefferson, therefore, early proposed a three-tier system of edu-
cation that would continually select the ablest while affording all the
chance to advance.4 Late in life, he and John Adams discussed the
attributes of a natural aristocracy.' They assumed that individuals dif-
fered in ability as well as in interest and also that those differences were
neither inherited nor conditioned upon civil status or position, but
rather were the products of natural endowment and of character. A
natural aristocracy, they concluded, was one based on merit and
achievement. That was why the Society of the Cincinnati, which made
heredity a requirement for membership, aroused such widespread
hostility.6
Equal meant equal in the eyes of the law. That connotation was con-
sistent with the few passages in the Constitution that had any bearing
on the matter. Article I referred to inhabitants and persons as the basis
for representation;7 article II distinguished natural born citizens eligible
for the Presidency;8 and article IV dealt with the comity of the citizens
2. Declaration of Rights, ch. 1, 9 Va. Stat. 109 (Hening 1776).
3. J. ROUSSEAU, The Second Discourse, in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 101 (R.
Masters ed. 1964).
4. 4 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 62-65 (P. Ford ed. 1904).
5. 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 52, 58, 64 (Little, Brown & Co. 1856); 4 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 226-31 (T. Randolph ed. 1830).
6. See D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS 371 (1958).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 3.
8. Id. at art. II, § 1, d. 5.
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of the states? Each allusion was to legal rights.
In the decades after ratification Americans adhered to the same con-
cept of equality. All individuals enjoyed the latitude of making what
they could of themselves free of those distinctions, restraints, and sup-
ports by which they believed European society sustained status. Gov-
ernment and the law treated all alike. Writing in 1790, John Jay
defined civil liberty as the equal right of "all the citizens to have, enjoy
and to do, in peace, security, and without molestation, whatever the
equal and constitutional laws of the country admit to be consistent with
the public good."'"
The implications were clearest when it came to religion, for concern
about toleration since the seventeenth century and concern about
equality since the Great Awakening focused the attack after the
Revolution on the inherited vestiges of establishment. It would take a
century to remove the last of them, and problems of separation of
church and state persisted even longer. But the commitment to equal-
ity in this sphere was clear at Independence.
The people of the Revolutionary generation, however, qualified the
term "equality" by certain large omissions. Although they were un-
clear and sometimes ambiguous on the subject, they did not mean to
abolish distinctions based on sex. Few men or women at the moment
considered the issue vital, for they then stood at a point of transition
between a society that revolved in every aspect about the integrated
household and one increasingly disposed to treat individuals in detach-
ment. The provisional frontier settlements of the colonial period had
given broader scope to the activity of women than had been character-
istic of Europe. With stability and development after 1783 that scope
tended to narrow. But neither earlier nor later did women enjoy a sta-
tus of full equality with men.
Furthermore, every signer of the Declaration and every American
for years thereafter understood that significant portions of the nation
were far from equal, even in the eyes of the law. The Constitution
referred to four categories of residents: free persons; those bound to
service for a number of years; all other persons (represented at three-
fifths of their total); and Indians not taxed." The human beings as-
signed to those classes were certainly not equal-in any sense.
9. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
10 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 395 (H. Johnston ed. 1891).
I1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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The listing was eloquent in what it did not say as well as in what it
did. Nowhere did the word "slave" appear, not even in article I, sec-
tion nine, which denied Congress the right to forbid the importation of
certain persons before 1808; 2 nor in article IV, section two, which dealt
with the return as fugitives of persons held to service or labor.13 Nor
did the Constitution anywhere refer to color. This reticence sprang
from the hope, expectation, and belief that slavery would not be a per-
manent feature of life in the Republic, but somehow would ultimately
disappear. Yet for the moment, the uncomfortable fact was that Negro
slaves lacked any rights whatever and even free blacks were far from
being the equals of whites.
Indians not taxed referred to those who remained members of their
tribes.14 The phrase was significant, for it distinguished between people
who entered the society about them and those who did not. The inten-
tion was to draw not a racial but a political line. Those who aban-
doned their inherited culture were Americans like others, but those
who chose to stay apart, although not unfree, nevertheless were not
equal in status to citizens.
Finally, Jefferson's contemporaries recognized that some people, by
acts of their own, put themselves in positions that diminished the
equality to which nature would have entitled them. Thus, seamen sub-
ject to the authority of their captains were not altogether free; nor were
soldiers during the period of their service; nor convicts during the terms
of their incarceration; nor apprentices or children during their minor-
ity. These were relationships of command and obedience and, there-
fore, of their nature involved inequalities. Yet they evoked no
challenge or criticism.
The concept of equality in the first half-century of the Republic was
thus limited and circumscribed. It bore no connotation of identical so-
cial and economic condition or status, but was essentially political. It
meant simply that those persons included in the polity were equal in
their relations to it.
12. "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand
eight hundred and eight. ... U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
13. No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labour may be due.
Id. art IV, § 2, cl. 3.
14. See note I I supra.
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The polity, however, was open. The unwillingness to accept the per-
manence of slavery, the expectation that Indians would move out of
their tribes, and the welcome accorded immigrants reflected the under-
lying belief that anyone by an act of will could become an American
and, therefore, an equal. These attitudes also reflected the basic as-
sumption that people were the products of their environment and capa-
ble of making of themselves what they wished. Since individual talents
and dispositions differed, there was no reason to believe that the results
of their efforts would bring them to identical places or yield identical
results. But all remained equal in the eyes of the law.
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the concept of equal-
ity received significant elaboration, although within the same frame-
work of fundamental assumptions. Equality continued to mean
equality under the law; and it continued to bear the corollary that its
application might produce strikingly different outcomes. But it now
seemed necessary to clear away needless encumbrances upon equality.
The imperative received most explicit expression in the body of
thought sometimes blanketed under the general rubric of Jacksonian
democracy. Its central thrust was directed toward the abolition of priv-
ileges that seemed to survive from an earlier past or that had taken root
unnoticed in the Republic.
Increasingly in the 1830's and 1840's, equality came to mean equality
of opportunity. All participants in the society were to strive to attain
their own objectives without state or other intervention that might as-
sist some or pose obstacles in the way of others. The movement for
universal suffrage was but the political expression of the impulse to-
ward equality of opportunity-putting the ballot in their hands would
enable all to protect themselves against the pretensions of status and
privilege. The principle of political equality, that is the sovereignty of
every man, explained an influential minister, was to the conception of a
republic.' 5
As to what constituted privilege, Jacksonian rhetoric was less precise,
for the term did not have the visible references that it had borne in the
eighteenth century and that it continued to bear in aristocratic societies,
titled nobility, exclusive guilds, and favored ecclesiastics. In a vague
way, privilege in the United States applied to any unfair advantage,
whether by birth, by wealth, or by grant of the state as in charters of
incorporation or licenses to banks to emit paper money. Americans
15. Seegentral;, E. CHAPIN, Tt-w RESPONSIBLITIES OF A REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT (1S41).
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were neither levelers, seeking a redistribution of property, nor advo-
cates of governmental passivity. They did insist that neither riches nor
the law in any way diminish competitive equality in the race of life.
It was not at all inconsistent, therefore, for the Jacksonians to press
for state action that would widen individual opportunity. Thus, they
enlisted in a continuing campaign to assure access to the landed re-
sources of the country for all those who wished to work the soil. They
also vigorously supported efforts to expand public education so that all
young people could prepare for the effort at advancement. The move-
ments for common schools, for the development of secondary and col-
legiate education, and for the conversion of all curricula to useful
subjects sprang from the same sources as the drive for preemption and
homestead-the insistence upon the state's role as an equalizer of com-
petitive opportunity.
Yet, while the emphasis changed, the underlying view of humanity
remained what it had been in the revolutionary era-people were in-
herently alike, except for ability and for variations induced by the envi-
ronment. Impressed by the diversity of people encountered in the city,
an observer of 1854 nevertheless insisted upon "the essential unity of
humanity. For, we find that the differences between men are formal
rather than real."' 6 It was in this sense that Lincoln still used the word
when he spoke at Gettysburg of a nation "dedicated to the proposition
that all men are created equal."'"
The Jacksonians were well aware, as the Jeffersonians had been, that
some residents of the United States suffered from considerable handi-
caps; and the nascent humanitarian reform movements of the same de-
cades sought to broaden the opportunities of all so as to approach
equality. This objective united such disparate groups as the abolition-
ists, who found slavery an offensive denial of the equality to which all
men were entitled, and the early campaigners for women's rights, for
ameliorating the conditions of prisoners, for aiding the poor and other
underprivileged social elements, and for normalizing the situation of
the Indians. These movements gained strength in the 1840's and
1850's, although the problem abolition addressed proved incapable of
resolution without the trauma of civil war.
The causes of that conflict and the motives for which Northerners
16. E. CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN IDEAS AND WHAT GROWS OUT OF IT 16 (1954) (emphasis
added).
17. 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
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fought it were mixed. But certainly among them was the determination
to abolish slavery and, in a small group at least, the determination to
bring the freed Negro to a full level of equality with whites.
In the debates of 1858 Lincoln had stated the position of many of his
countrymen. While disavowing any desire for personal mingling of the
races, he maintained that the Negro was "entitled to all the natural
rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence." In "the right
to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand
earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas and the equal of
every living man."'"
This objective of equality by no means commanded the support of
all Northerners or even of all northern abolitionists, but it had a persis-
tent nucleus of supporters both in Congress and in the whole country.
Its monuments were the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution 9 and the civil rights acts cul-
minating in that of 1875.2 These measures, bitterly debated and
enacted with difficulty, put every American on an identical footing in
the eyes of the law and in the face of opportunity. The amendments
excluded any abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens
by the states;2' or the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws;22 or any restraints on the right to vote on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.23 The laws forbade discrimination
and assured to all equal status in transportation and public accommo-
dations. 24 The approach of amendments and legislation was well
within the existing concept of equality and the thrust was negative.
Certain state actions were forbidden; none were enjoined. Nor did Re-
construction measures aim to go beyond the existing concept of equal-
ity before the law. Above all, their guarantees protected individuals,
not groups.
The nation, however, never tested the effectiveness of these efforts.
Ironically, precisely at the point at which the law approached recogni-
tion of the right of all Americans, including blacks, to complete equal-
18. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 102 (E. Sparks ed. 1908) (emphasis
added).
19. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §.
22, Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
24. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch, 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335.
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ity, scientific and popular thought accepted ideas that justified racial
inequality.
The racist interlude began in the 1850's; Josiah Nott, George Fitz-
hugh and other defenders of slavery then argued that Negroes were a
distinct, inferior species whose characteristic traits justified their bond-
age.25 But faith in the literal accuracy of the Bible and in the common
descent of all mankind from a single pair of ancestors prevented ortho-
dox Christians from accepting that argument until well after 1859 when
the penetration of Darwinian ideas led to acceptance of the belief in
innate biological differences among races arising from separate lines of
evolution.26 The new ideas found a strategic place after 1865 in the
armaments by which unreconstructed southerners sought to maintain
the inferiority of the free Negroes, preserve conditions analogous to
those of slavery, and in time circumvent the civil rights acts and the
fourteenth amendment. Racism gathered additional support in the
1870's and 1880's when Americans along the Pacific and in the north-
em states discovered its utility as they confronted the questions of Ori-
ental and East European immigration.
Operating within this intellectual context, the courts and state legisla-
tures proceeded to narrow the meanings of the Reconstruction meas-
ures. The judges and legislators were, of course, also sincerely
concerned with other matters such as the effects of increased national
and diminished state authority on American federalism and the proper
scope of the police power. But no thinking person could shake off the
implications for race relations, even in cases that in the first instance
dealt with other subjects.
Judicial decisions after the Slaughter-House Cases27 freed the states
to act in racial matters without excessive concern for the restraints of
the fourteenth amendment. In Hall v. DuCuir28 the Supreme Court,
dealing with transportation, took up Lemuel Shaw's observation in the
Roberts Case, 9 dealing with education, that equality did not necessar-
ily involve identity, and thus established a basis for Jim Crow practices.
Meanwhile, the southern economy doomed blacks to tenantry and local
manipulation deprived them of the vote and all political influence.
25. G. FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! (C. Van Woodward ed. 1960); J. NoTT & G. GLIDDON,
TYPES OF MANKIND 260 (1854).
26. C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
28. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
29. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
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For the period between 1890 and 1930, the record was dismal. A line
of increasing rigidity segregated blacks from the rest of society and
condemned them to inferiority. The doctrine of "separate but equal,"
fully enunciated in Plessj, r. Ferguson,3" validated evolving Jim Crow
patterns and in practice shielded inequality. The distinction between
social and legal equality hardened in that case,3 and thereafter became
the instrument for establishing racial inferiority in education, resi-
dence, and employment.
The damage was by no means to blacks alone. Racism also entered
into the anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic movements that punctuated
these years, and it adversely affected as well such groups as Italian-
Americans and Greek-Americans. The disadvantaged minorities suf-
fered to varying degrees; but all labored under some burden of
inequality.
Yet in retrospect, it was also significant that restraints both in the law
and in society stood as barriers to racism. The Constitution, as the
judges now interpreted it, was neutral, incapable of intervening to halt
discrimination by state or private action. But no majority, however
large or powerful, could explicitly legislate against a group, not even in
the deepest South where the desire for apartheid was explicit. Even
Plessv v. Ferguson contained the saving qualification "but equal"; and
though for the moment it seemed of little consequence, that qualifica-
tion ultimately would bring the whole doctrine tumbling down.
The judges were not more enlightened or less prejudiced than other
men and women. They operated under one inflexible constraint. No-
where did the Constitution recognize groups; it treated only individu-
als. It was not merely color blind, as Justice Harlan's dissent put it;32
both the original charter and the fourteenth amendment recognized
only persons, and neither legislation nor judicial decisions could get
around that awkwardness.
Furthermore, a broad social consensus still affirmed the faith in
equality of opportunity for all. That faith explained the somewhat in-
congruous American mingling of respect for achievement and insis-
tence upon the fundamental equality of all men, noted by Lord Bryce
in the 1880's. Success in whatever field earned popular esteem-in
business, politics, the church, battle, or philosophy. A Vanderbilt,
30 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
31. Id. at 552.
32. Id (Harlan, J., dissenting)
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Webster, Beecher, Grant, or Emerson was "an object of interest, per-
haps of admiration." But each was "deemed to be still of the same
flesh and blood as other men."3 Not only defenders of the status quo,
but also every variety of progressive and socialist critic looked toward
the identical remedy for present faults-increase in opportunity. "Not
human equality, but equality of opportunity to prevent the creation of
artificial inequalities by privilege is the essence of socialism," John
Spargo exclaimed in terms that Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson would
have accepted. 4
Hence, it was possible to keep the creed intact, although social reali-
ties often departed from it. In accepting the Presidential nomination in
1904, Theodore Roosevelt said, "[t]his government is based upon the
fundamental idea that each man, no matter what his occupation, his
race, or his religious belief, is entitled to be treated on his worth-as a
man, and neither favored nor discriminated against because of any ac-
cident in his position. ' 35 He knew very well that black people labored
under crushing disabilities, and that other Americans suffered seriously
from discrimination. Yet he was not a hypocrite in his rhetoric.
Rather, he expressed a statement of purpose that dedicated the Repub-
lic to the goal of equality before the law, a goal inherited from the
Revolution and as yet unattained.
Perception of that possibility guided the one successful move toward
equality in the whole of this unhappy period, the move that culminated
in 1920 with ratification of the nineteenth amendment, which forbade
any abridgment of the right to vote on account of sex. 6 Reformers
who sought to ameliorate the condition of women had long dissipated
their energy in pursuit of unrealistic objectives unattractive to the ma-
jority, male or female. The judicial ruling in 1875 that the guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment applied to race only and thus not to sex3 7
had defined a remediable grievance; and after 1890 the crusaders for
women's rights, focusing on the issue of suffrage, had waged successful
local campaigns and finally gained constitutional sanction for equality
at the ballot box, nationwide. That issue was comprehensible and thus
33. J. BRYCE, 2 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 606 (1888).
34. J. SPARGO, SOCIALISM 236 (1906).
35. 15 THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 65 (P.F. Collier & Son, Executive ed. 1897-
1906).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
37. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Van
Alstyne & Karst, StateAction, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action,
41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963).
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capable of winning wide support that broad-ranging attacks on ac-
cepted institutions and habits could not. In addition, it did not encoun-
ter the brutal complications of race.
The tide turned after the First World War, although the conse-
quences did not become fully apparent for another thirty years. A few
social scientists, like Lester Ward and Franz Boas, already had rejected
the concept of innate racial differences and thus had weakened the in-
tellectual props of racism." Slowly in the 1920's, more swiftly after
1930, and still more so after 1945, Americans turned their backs upon
the devisive doctrines. Meanwhile, the second and third generation de-
scendants of immigrants moved toward positions of influence in gov-
ernment and society, while northward migration gave blacks a political
base. These groups formed an alliance of minorities with support from
the revived labor movement of the 1930's; and the cement that held
those potent forces together was a recognition that discrimination was
the source of inequality. A common strategy followed from that per-
ception-the eradication of all barriers based on race, creed, or na-
tional origin. The tactics employed called for devising a mechanism by
which the law could intercede to lower such barriers. The reinterpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment so that it applied not only to the
states, but also to their agencies and, in time, to private bodies provided
a basis for expanding the scope of the guarantees of equal protection of
the law.39
The social forces leading to the struggles against discrimination
gained strength after 1940, partly as a result of the Depression, partly as
a result of the Second World War, and partly as a result of the steadily
increasing political influence of the coalition of minorities. In the two
decades after 1940, these groups struggled successfully to eliminate the
restraints upon equality and opportunity in employment,40 in hous-
ing,4' and in education.42 The basic thrust was, as it had been since the
Civil War, negative-that is, to forbid discrimination based on group
characteristics. Fierce resistance in the Congress and in some one-
party Southern states, which disenfranchised a large part of the electo-
38. F. BOAS, Race and Progress, in RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 3 (1940); L. WARD,
APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 107-10 (1906).
39. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
40, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-I to 17 (1976) (Title VII).
41 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976) (Title VIII).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-1 to 9 (1976) (Title IV).
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rate, slowed progress toward that objective. But in many cases it was
clear by 1960 that this struggle was won or shortly would be.
In the fight for equality, the line of argument-political and judi-
cial-had been consistent and bounded by commitments both to indi-
vidual cases and to pluralism. The battle against the residues of racism
was directed at injustices done individuals, not groups; and it dis-
avowed any intention of imposing a flat uniformity or homogeneity on
American society. Indeed, the civil rights campaign avoided a frontal
attack upon the reasoning of Plessy v. Ferguson,3 focusing instead
upon factual demonstrations that separate was not equal. As the Court
held in Sweatt v. Painter," the evidence revealed that the law school
provided to blacks was not equivalent in any sense to that available to
whites in the University of Texas. Separateness was not at issue; de-
monstrable inequality was. Even Brown 145 did not go beyond the
finding of actual structural inequality in the schools of the city. Nor
did the briefs of plaintiffs in that decisive case go further.
The process of implementing the Brown decision and of extending its
meaning to areas other than education was painfully slow. The Court
had called for all deliberate speed.46 But the problems of transforming
social institutions calcified through decades of acceptance would have
been difficult even had they been addressed with the greatest good will.
They were not. In the South die hard resistance by violence, judicial
appeal, and community action generated delay after delay. And even
apart from these impediments of residual racism and entrenched con-
servatism, more important but less noticed complexities prevented any
easy solution. A profound displacement had shifted black population
from rural to urban areas and from the South to the North and West.
The remedies conceived in 1954 were applicable to the inequalities
caused by segregation and by the Jim Crow patterns of the past, overtly
and formally created by governmental or communal agencies. The
same remedies did not apply to places where segregation was incidental
to recently evolved residential patterns, with origins totally dissimilar
to those of the rural South. Yet no one embroiled in the old war gave
serious thought to the differences of approach the new one required.
As a result, the painfully won victories of the eleven years after
Brown brought not contentment and peace, but resentment and re-
43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
44. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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newed conflict. The most significant victories were those pried out of a
reluctant Congress by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 and
1965-the one a potent civil rights law,47 the other a statute on suf-
trage4" that opened the way to black participation and soon trans-
tormed the politics of the South and the northern cities.
The quest for equality thus entered a totally new stage after 1965,
one largely based at first upon the unsatisfied needs of black Americans
now possessed of power, especially in the northern cities. In this stage
equality ceased to refer to opportunity and increasingly came to refer to
results. Government was not merely to eliminate prejudice and dis-
crimination by negative action, but also to assure to such underprivi-
leged groups as the blacks a distribution proportionate to their numbers
of the desirable places in American society by affirmative action.
The leading figures in this struggle were totally unaware of the na-
ture of the issues and of the consequences of the course advocated. In a
volatile society in which swiftly changing currents concealed all tradi-
tional moorings, events blew in unpredictable directions and people
who lacked any inner sense of direction drifted to unanticipated
destinations.
Significantly, the battleground of the struggle for expanded civil
rights shifted after 1965 from the floor of Congress to the courtroom
and to the bureaucratic office; the radical changes after that date came
by judicial and administrative rulings rather than by way of legislation.
Enactment of statutes required the support of popular majorities that
could no longer be mobilized either in the area of civil rights or else-
where; and increasingly, the courts and the executive ventured to act
instead. Thus, the dilatory tactics of states in dealing with apportion-
ment had enticed the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr49 to enunciate a
wide-reaching and novel conception of one-person-one-vote. Thus too,
the dilatory tactics of building trade employers and unions had induced
the Secretary of Labor to move to a fair hiring pattern by executive
order.50
There was a vital difference between judicial and legislative reme-
dies, even in cases in which the malady was correctly diagnosed and the
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447,
42 U.S C. §§ 1971, 1971a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976)).
48 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973b-4 (1976)).
49 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. Exec. Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965).
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prescribed treatment was appropriate. The necessity of pulling to-
gether a majority forced legislators to consider the effects of the remedy
upon the whole body. Judges did not have to do so; they could, if they
wished, write their opinions out of the case books and out of their own
understanding of justice. Therein lay the essential difference between
political and judicial action.
Administrative acts also lacked the sanction of a popular majority
and in their nature were resistant to popular pressures. Bureaucratic
measures differed from legislative and judicial ones, for while bounded
by statutes and decisions, they were the products of the intentions of
those who framed them and, consciously or unconsciously, reflected the
particular assumptions and presuppositions of the officeholders. For
more than a decade those conceptions turned about a definition of
equality determinable by results, so that any variance from uniformity
was a prima facie sign of discrimination; de facto and de jure segrega-
tion merged into one. That these views had the support of no test at the
ballot box, except insofar as the election of 1972 was a negative one,
did not lighten their impact.
In the absence of legislative resolution of the problems inherent in
the new concept of equality, judicial gropings toward consistent case
law and free-wheeling administrative rulings left Americans curiously
in the dark about vital aspects of their lives as the 1970's drew to a
close. It will be enough to enumerate some of the problems created by
abandonment of the historic conception of equality.
Brown held that race was not a proper ground for school assignment.
By tortuous logic various courts have held that race was a necessary
ground for assignment in order to attain the objectives of Brown: not
everywhere-not in Detroit, for instance-but in Los Angeles and Bos-
ton, depending somehow on readings of past intent. Race also became
a criterion for assessing the fairness of employment practices, the valid-
ity of ability tests, and the legality of some-though not all-residential
patterns.
The Constitution and the statutes had taken cognizance only of per-
sons. The rulings after 1965 treated groups, which therefore had to be
defined. Before very long, numerous claimants to underprivileged sta-
tus joined the blacks. The Indians, Asians, and Hispanics found mani-
fest advantages to identification as minorities, as did Italo-Americans
and Polish-Americans. Women's voices swiftly rose in charges that sex
was as often a source of deprivation as ethnicity. Elaborately calcu-
lated goals designed to meet competing claims-the euphemistic term
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for quotas-produced a situation in which inequality of access became
a necessary condition of equal results.
Since the law knew no way of defining group membership other than
by self-identification, it treated each category as fixed, homogeneous,
and solidary. The offspring of three generations of well-to-do middle
class college graduates were still black, as deprived on the application
form as youths from the slums, while the children of migrants from
Appalachia were white, as advantaged as any other Wasps.
To make results the measure of equality required the assumption
that occupational abilities and preferences were randomly distributed
in society-that within any subsidiary population pool the same per-
centage of individuals could and wished to be physicians or football
players, chess players or businessmen-so that deviations from the
norm were evidence of discrimination and called for governmental ac-
tion. No evidence whatever supported that assumption. The relation
of ethnicity to ability had been irrelevant so long as the law treated
only individuals, who sorted themselves out without regard to group
lines. The issue became relevant only when governmental rulings pro-
ceeded from the expectation that every population cross section would
contain the same admixture of elements. At that point the issue be-
came so laden with emotion, prejudice, interest, and politics as to move
beyond the point of rational, scientific consideration.
Incontestable, however, was the evidence-historical, anthropologi-
cal, and sociological-of an undissolvable bond between culture and
calling, between life style, values, and attitudes toward the world on the
one hand and, on the other, the ability and inclination to heal scientifi-
cally, to compete in contact sports, to play chess, and to make money.
Yet at the very time that results became the measure of equality,
blacks, Indians, chicanos, and other groups began to stress their cul-
tural particularity, emphasizing especially the unique traits bound to
lead to heterogeneity in outcome without evermore frequent govern-
mental intervention.
In 1978 the social effects are incalculable. They include at least the
possibility of a vast deterioration of competence in tasks vital to all.
The alternative method of achieving equality of results was long fa-
miliar to social theorists; uniformity of incomes would dissolve all in-
centive for any work for which the individual was unfit. The
benevolent rulers of Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward5 evened
51. E. BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (1888).
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out differences and imposed centralized standards on a uniform and
homogeneous populace. Equality there was that of the prison camp
and the army batallion. Indeed, Bellamy called his labor force the In-
dustrial Army. But it was equality of results.
More than two centuries ago, Rousseau understood the concomitants
of that kind of equality--enrichment of the state, impoverishment of
the people by the removal of surpluses through taxation, and destruc-
tion of the arts, sciences, and civilization that he regarded as the cause
of inequality.52 In theory, at least, he was willing to pay the price.
Americans were not, and their historic concept of equality of oppor-
tunity did not require it; hence the uncertain consequences of the vital
changes now demanded on them.
52. See note 3 supra.
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